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I. INTRODUCTION
The only mode of governance that Western nations currently regard as
acceptable is democracy. We demand democracy for the nation as a whole and for
its subsidiary units such as states or provinces, cities, and sometimes even smaller
or more specialized public bodies. It is therefore natural for us to ask whether this
same model of control should apply to corporations, the most important economic
organizations in our society.
Worker democracy is traditionally linked to socialism,1 where the state owns
the means of production. Proposals for corporate democracy within the framework
of a capitalist system currently fall into three basic categories. The first is employee
democracy, where those who work for the corporation, rather than the
corporation’s owners, exercise control of its operations.2 The second is stakeholder
 University Professor of Law and Political Science, Vanderbilt University. I want to thank Robert
Ashford, Margaret Blair, Robert Cooter, Eric Orts, and Randall Thomas for their assistance with the corporate
governance information and ideas that are incorporated in this article.
1 See, e.g., BERNARD H. MOSS, THE ORIGINS OF THE FRENCH LABOR MOVEMENT: THE SOCIALISM OF
SKILLED WORKERS, 1830-1914 (Univ. of Calif. Press 1st ed. 1976) (unifying ideology of French workers’
socialism was “a federalist trade socialism in which the means of production would be owned collectively within
the framework of a federation of skilled trades”). See generally STEPHEN E. PHILION, WORKERS’ DEMOCRACY IN
CHINA’S TRANSITION FROM STATE SOCIALISM (Routledge 2009) (workers’ democracy served as a discourse of
resistance to the oppressive features of China’s post 1980 privatization); DAVID SCHWEICKART, AFTER
CAPITALISM (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2nd ed. 2011) (proposing worker democracy as the basis of a
socialist successor to capitalism).
2. JERGEN GOUL ANDERSEN & JENS HOFF, DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP IN SCANDINAVIA 114-34
(Palgrave Macmillan 1st ed. 2001) (providing descriptions of worker participation and management programs).
See generally Chris Doucouliagos, Worker Participation and Productivity in Labor-Managed and Participatory
Capitalist Firms: A Meta-Analysis, 49 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 58 (1995) (surveying 43 studies indicating that
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democracy, where those who are directly affected by the corporation—its
employees again, but also its subcontractors, consumers and neighbors—exercise
control.3 Proponents of both these proposals treat them as a mode of corporate
management. The third set of proposals can be either of these first two versions,
but proponents tend to treat them as a way that people can become engaged in the
process of governance and develop participatory habits or attitudes in a mass
society where widespread involvement in national politics is difficult—and
perhaps unrealistic.4
In all three of these approaches to corporate democracy, the relationship
between political democracy and corporate governance is analogical. In the first
two, the analogy is between public governance and private management. The
assertion is that the mode of control or decision-making that is used in the public
arena can be adopted in the private arena for different purposes. Democracy in the
public arena is justified as a means of enabling citizens to control their destinies
and avoid government oppression. As applied to corporate governance, democratic
decision-making is proposed in the first case as a means of achieving efficiency
and increasing job satisfaction or motivation. In the second case, it is primarily
proposed as a means of controlling the corporation’s impact on the range of people
it affects and, secondarily, of achieving similar efficiency gains. The third case
involves an analogy between individual behavior in the workplace and in the
political arena. Thus, the connection occurs within the individual, rather than from
one institution to another, but it is still an analogy.
This article proposes a different rationale for corporate democracy, one that
extends more broadly to all forms of employment. It is based on an equivalence,
not an analogy. The equivalence is that subordination feels essentially the same to
an individual whether a public or a private entity is carrying it out. As recognized
in the public arena, it undermines people’s dignity and autonomy, and at least
threatens—and often produces—actual oppression. Based on this equivalence, this
article proposes a different argument for corporate democracy. Proponents of
democracy in the public sphere believe that the citizens of a nation should control
its government. For the same reason, it can be argued that those who work for a
living should control the institutions for which they work. Thus, the norms of
democracy, when translated into the economic realm, yield the principle that no

most forms of worker participation and control increase productivity).
3. See, e.g., ARCHIE B. CARROLL & ANN K. BUCHHOLTZ, BUSINESS & SOCIETY: ETHICS, SUSTAINABILITY
AND STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT (Cengage Learning 9th ed. 2014); JAMES E. POST, LEE E. PRESTON &
SYBILLE SACHS, REDEFINING THE CORPORATION: STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL
WEALTH (Stanford Business Books 1st ed. 2002); lan Verbeke & Vincent Tung, The Future of Stakeholder
Management Theory: A Temporal Perspective, 112 J. BUS. ETHICS 529 (2012).
4. See generally G.D.H. Cole, Guild Socialism Restated (1920); G.D.H. Cole, Self-Government in Industry
(1919); Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge Univ. Press 1970).
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person should work for their livelihood on terms established by another person.
This can be called the principle of popular economic sovereignty.
The operational argument that can instantiate this assertion of equivalence
between the state and the corporation is etiological. Both institutions, in their
modern form, developed from Medieval corporativist thought. They are conceived
as juridical persons, entities that are capable of independent action. As such, they
have an equivalent capacity to dominate and oppress the individuals that they
control. The way to provide these individuals with a sense of autonomy and protect
them from oppression is to constitute them as a separate juridical entity that is
authorized to control the state or the corporation, either directly or—in cases where
the state or corporation is large—through chosen representatives.
The argument proceeds in four steps. The first is that our current way of
conceiving both the state and the corporation developed from medieval
corporativist thinking. Second, this same mode of thought generated the idea of
representation that enabled individuals who were not leaders of a structured
hierarchy to participate in state decisions. Third, representation became the
mechanism by which democratic government was instituted. Fourth, as democracy
developed, the scope of representation expanded to include all competent adults.
Fifth, that this same expanded concept of representation can be extended to
corporations and would serve the same purposes as it serves in the political arena.
Part I will explicate the first two stages of the argument, corporativist thinking and
the concept of representation in politics. Part II explicates the next two stages, the
use of representation in democracy and the expansion of its scope. Part III then
presents the argument that this expanded idea of representation can be extended to
corporations on the basis on their common conceptual origin with the state. It
concludes that employees—either directly or more typically by choosing
representatives—should be the controlling force of modern economic entities. This
principle, which serves the same purposes in the workplace that democracy serves
in politics, is referred to as popular economic sovereignty. This concludes the
argument, which is essentially theoretical. Part IV goes on to show that this
principle, although it sounds radical and impractical, could in fact be implemented
rather easily in a capitalist system for both major corporations and all other
employment relationships as well.
II. THE THEORETICAL BASIS FOR POPULAR ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY
We can often gain important insights into something that we take for granted
if we approach it with a sense of wonder. The same is true for the nation state and
the business corporation. Some version of these modes of organization were
perhaps developed by the ancestors of Western civilization, but their modern form
emerged from developments during the so-called Gothic period that the

41

2021 / Extending Democracy to Corporate Governance and Beyond
Renaissance humanists associated with unlettered barbarians. Contrary to both
these widespread but unsubstantiated images, this was one of the most creative
periods in human history,5 with the conception of the state and the corporation
counting as two of its great achievements. Both are products of the same
conceptual advance and thus possess a deep connection to each other that goes well
beyond analogy.
In the Early Middle Ages—as Ernst Kantorowicz explains—religious thinkers
regarded the bread of the Eucharist as the mystical body of Christ (corpus
mysticum) and the Church as the true body of Christ (corpus verum).6 This latter
notion was derived from the view that what we now call organizations were groups
of individuals united by affective bonds—bonds based on their feelings toward
each other. Economic organizations were enterprises conducted by families, bound
together by their biological relationship, or partnerships, bound by the partners’
personal commitments to each other.7 Political organizations could be a city to
which all citizens owed loyalty,8 or a kingdom bound together by loyalty to its
monarch. In response to the 11th century disputes regarding transubstantiation, the
Church moved to the position that the bread was the actual body of Christ, the
corpus verum. The idea of Christ’s mystical body thus became available as a
description of the Church: a description that responded to and simultaneously
advanced a variety of conceptual trends that were occurring at the time.9
To describe an organization as a mystical body invests it with a separate
identity; it becomes a being of its own, an entity capable of action. Once the Church
had been defined in these terms, its Medieval rival for authority—the state—could
be conceived in similar terms. It became a corpus mysticum as well, but as a largely
political institution. The mystical became juridical—still vaguely tied to sacerdotal
concepts, but increasingly secular as the centralizing monarchies acquired staff,
official records, and other features of administration. The result, as Kantorowicz
notes, was “a corporational character signifying a ‘fictitious’ or ‘juristic’ person.”10
In the 12th century, John of Salisbury invoked the familiar analogy between
5. See generally R.W. SOUTHERN, THE MAKING OF THE MIDDLE AGES (Yale Univ. Press 1953); JOSEPH R.
STRAYER, ON THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE MODERN STATE (Princeton Univ. Press 1970).
6. ERNST KANTOROWICZ, THE KING’S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THEOLOGY 195–
97 (Princeton Univ. Press 1957).
7. See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF A
REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 1–12 (Modern Library 2003); ANDREAS TELEVANTOS, CAPITALISM BEFORE
CORPORATIONS: THE MORALITY OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS AND THE ROOTS OF COMMERCIAL EQUITY AND
LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 2020).
8. HENRI PIRENNE, MEDIEVAL CITIES: THEIR ORIGINS AND THE REVIVAL OF TRADE 35–48 (Frank D.
Halsey, trans. 1952); MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1236–62 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich, eds.
1978).
9. KANTOROWICZ, supra note 6, at 197–208; see TOM HOLLAND, THE FORGE OF CHRISTENDOM: THE END
OF DAYS AND THE EPIC RISE OF THE WEST 351–90 (2010) (discussing the Gregorian Reform Movement as a
principal trend).
10. KANTOROWICZ, supra note 6, at 209.
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society and the human body: with the ruler as its head, its soldiers and
administrative officials as its arms, and the peasants as its feet.11 Now, however,
this imaginary being could be seen as a functioning entity—the body politic—with
the king as the head in his juridical, and thus immortal, capacity rather than his
personal capacity. Kantorowicz quotes Lucas de Penna, a 14th century Italian
jurist, for the idea that “men are joined together morally and politically in the
respublica, the head of which is the Prince.”12 The famous frontispiece of Hobbes’
Leviathan, where a monarch with a crowned head and a body composed of tiny
subjects rises up above the countryside, grasping a sword and scepter, is a depiction
of this concept.13
With both the Church and state conceived as juridical persons—separate from
the people who composed them and thus free from the mortality to which those
people’s physical bodies must succumb—the way was open for the creation of still
other such immortal entities. Ever since the Germanic invasions ended centralized
Roman authority in the West, the kings of the successor states had granted
governance authority to their followers and allies, typically in the form of the land
grants that defined the feudal system.14 Beginning in the 12th century, as the
revival of trade and manufacturing was turning feudalism from governance into
ceremony,15 the centralizing monarchs of the emerging nation states began issuing
charters to groups of people who were creating, or being created by, this
momentous economic development. In particular, the monarchs issued legal
charters establishing the quondam family enterprises or business partnerships as
the first corporations.16 At the same time, they issued city charters to the expanding
commercial centers.17 Both types of charters created entities with the status of a
juridical person, a corpus mysticum, with legal specification taking the place of
mystery.18

11. JOHN OF SALISBURY, POLICRATICUS: OF THE FRIVOLITIES OF COURTIERS AND THE FOOTPRINTS OF
PHILOSOPHERS (Cary J. Nederman, trans., 1990).
12. KANTOROWICZ, supra note 6, at 216.
13. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 2 (Richard Tuck, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (depicting a
reproduction of the original 1651 frontispiece in this edition).
14. See MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 145–210 (L.A. Manyon, trans., 1961); HEINRICH FICHTENAU,
LIVING IN THE TENTH CENTURY: MENTALITIES AND SOCIAL ORDERS 141–56 (Patrick J. Geary, trans., 1991). See
generally F.L. GANSHOF, FEUDALISM (Philip Grierson, trans., 3rd ed. 1963).
15. See generally ROBERT S. LOPEZ, THE COMMERCIAL REVOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE AGES, 950–1350
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1976); PIRENNE, supra note 8, at 49–67.
16. See JOHN P. DAVIS, CORPORATIONS: A STUDY OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF GREAT BUSINESS
COMBINATIONS AND THEIR RELATION TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 88–91 (G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1905). See
generally GERMAIN SICARD, THE ORIGINS OF CORPORATIONS: THE MILLS OF TOULOUSE IN THE MIDDLE AGES
(Matthew Landry, trans., 2015).
17. See ROBERT BARTLETT, THE MAKING OF EUROPE: CONQUEST, COLONIZATION AND CULTURAL
CHANGE, 950–1350 (Princeton Univ. Press 1994); Davis, supra note 16, at 92–129; DAVID NICHOLAS, THE
GROWTH OF THE MEDIEVAL CITY: FROM LATE ANTIQUITY TO THE EARLY FOURTEENTH CENTURY 87-114, 14157 (Routledge 1st ed. 1997); PIRENNE, supra note 8, at 35–48.
18. SICARD, supra note 16, at 199–217.
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During this period, two forces were arrayed in opposition to the centralizing
monarchs: the Catholic Church and the nobility. The Church, despite a somewhat
desperate effort to secure its power by organizing the Crusades,19 was rapidly
losing ground as the newly founded universities provided graduates—mainly
lawyers—who could counteract the Church’s previous monopoly of literate
officers, and various territorial expansions or disruptions provided soldiers—
mainly mercenaries—who fought for money rather than faith. Its effort to obtain
control of episcopal appointments, although amplifying papal authority in the short
run, triggered titanic struggles with the monarchs that attenuated Church authority
as time went on.20 There followed the self-inflicted wound of the Western Schism
that largely ended the Church’s ability to oppose the monarchs,21 adumbrating the
more complete demise of its authority in the Reformation.22
The nobility proved more formidable. Their military power quickly ebbed
though the development of mercenary armies who could defeat them in the field,
and of artillery that could defeat them when they retreated to their castles. The
levers of local administration remained in their hands somewhat longer due to their
ownership of agricultural land, but gradually yielded to emerging royal
administrations, staffed by those same university graduates.23 One resource that
the nobles retained, however, was law and custom, which in this case at least
proved more durable than steel, stone, or soil. Feudalism was clearly in decline but
the nobles, whose physical battles were increasingly limited to tournaments,
defended their more abstract rights and privileges with undiminished energy.24

19. See generally STEVEN RUNCIMAN, A HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES, VOL 1: THE FIRST CRUSADE AND THE
FOUNDATION OF THE KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM (Cambridge Univ. Press 1987).
20. See, e.g., HOLLAND, supra note 9, at xvi-xx, 374–90 (explaining the Investiture Crisis as Emperor Henry
IV’s conflict with Pope Gregory VII over ecclesiastical appointments); L.S. ROBINSON, HENRY IV OF GERMANY,
1056–1106, at 105–236 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2003); W.L. WARREN, KING JOHN 154–73 (Univ. of Cal. Press
2nd ed. 1978) (discussing King John’s conflict with Pope Innocent III regarding the appointment of Stephen
Langton as Archbishop of Canterbury).
21. See generally JOELLE ROLLO-KOSTER, AVIGNON AND ITS PAPACY 1309-1417: POPES, INSTITUTIONS
AND SOCIETY (2015); F. DONALD LOGAN, A HISTORY OF THE CHURCH IN THE MIDDLE AGES 297–331 (Routledge
2nd ed. 2012); JOHN STRICKLAND, THE AGE OF DIVISION: CHRISTENDOM FROM THE GREAT SCHISM TO THE
PROTESTANT REFORMATION (2020). The Great Schism involved the separation of the Eastern Orthodox Church
from the Roman Catholic Church in 1054. The Western Schism, which lasted from 1376 to 1417, involved rival
claimants to the papacy in Rome and Avignon, and is generally regarded as undermining people’s commitment
to the Church as an institution.
22. See generally OWEN CHADWICK, THE REFORMATION (Penguin Books 1st ed. 1964); DIARMAID
MACCULLOCH, THE REFORMATION: A HISTORY (Viking Adult 1st ed. 2004).
23. See JONATHAN DEWALD, THE EUROPEAN NOBILITY (Cambridge Univ. Press 1st ed. 1996); NORBERT
ELIAS, State Formation and Civilization, in THE CIVILIZING PROCESS, 257 (Edwin Jephcott, trans., 1994);
Michael Rush, The Decline of the Nobility, in DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN EUROPE: DIVERSITY, CHANGE
AND CONVENIENCE 29 (Maurizio Cotta & Heinrich Best, eds., 2007); Christopher Storrs & H. M. Scott, The
Military Revolution and the European Nobility, 1600–1800, in WARFARE IN EUROPE, 1650–1792, at 3 (Jeremy
Black, ed., 2005).
24. BLOCH, supra note 14, at 320–31.
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Corporativism provided the centralizing monarchs with an effective response
to the legal rights of the nobility. One reason that the nobility retained its position
and prestige was that its status was based on the same source as the monarchs, that
is, control of land. But the corporate charters that the monarchs issued for trade
and manufacture created juridical entities whose owners and managers owed their
wealth to lower-status occupations that kept them dependent on the monarch for
their social standing. The cities that the monarchs chartered as corporate entities
were similarly separate from the feudal system, and thus dependent directly, and
exclusively, on the monarch as well. In the Holy Roman Empire, where the
charters extended its boundaries to the east and established the Hanseatic ports, it
was said that “stadtluft macht frei” (“city air makes one free”).25 This was not, at
least originally, a reference to sybaritic or anonymous character of urban life, but
rather to the fact that serfs were released from their feudal obligations after
spending more than one year in the city—thus becoming direct subjects of the king.
The newly chartered cities and other areas where commoners had obtained
their freedom then produced the further conceptual advance of political
representation. Feudal law and custom provided the kings with various sources of
revenue with evocative names such as carucage, frankalmoign, scutage, tallage and
merchet, but these proved insufficient for all the lawyers, administrations, soldiers,
and artillery that they needed for their centralizing efforts. Kings could overcome
these limitations and enact new taxes only if they obtained the consent of those
they were proposing to tax.26 Such consent had to be obtained from each of the
three estates into which society was divided—the clergy, the nobility, and the
commoners.27 The means of making the request, if not necessarily obtaining the
consent, was easy enough for the clergy, which organized itself in a strict hierarchy
with clearly identified leaders. The nobility was similarly hierarchical under the
feudal system, with a relatively small number being direct vassals, or tenants-inchief, of the king. In England, these direct vassals numbered a mere twenty-five

25. PIRENNE, supra note 8, at 4; Jeffrey S. Debies-Carl & Christopher M. Huggins, “City Air Makes Free”:
A Multi-Level, Cross-National Analysis of Self-Efficacy, 72 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 343 (2009).
26. See generally Yoram Barzal & Edgar Kiser, Taxation and Voting Rights in Medieval England and
France, 14 RATIONALITY AND SOC’Y 473 (2002); Bernd Schneidmüller, Rule by Consensus: Forms and Concepts
of Political Order in the European Middle Ages, 16 MEDIEVAL HIST. J. 449 (2014).
27. The Estates General of France was organized according to this division. See generally MICHAEL
HAYDEN, FRANCE AND THE ESTATES GENERAL OF 1614 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1st ed. 1974) (describing the
last meeting of the Estates General until the Revolution and summarizing its previous history). In the English
Parliament, the clergy and nobility met together in the House of Lords, and the representatives of the commoners
met in a separate chamber. See CLYVE JONES ET AL., A SHORT HISTORY OF PARLIAMENT (2012); J.R MADDICOTT,
THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT, 924–1327 (Oxford Univ. Press 1st ed. 2012). Medieval people
generally thought about their society in terms of these three estates. See GEORGES DUBY, THE THREE ORDERS:
FEUDAL SOCIETY IMAGINED (Arthur Goldhammer, trans., 1980); WEBER, supra note 8, at 236–37. This tripartite
division was often described as oratores, bellatores and laboratores – those who pray, those who fight, and those
who work.
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when the Magna Carta was signed in 1215, and it was probably these twentyfive—and certainly not a petty jury—that the famous Chapter 39 references, when
King John promised not to prosecute or punish any of the signatories except by
“the lawful judgment of his peers.”28
Obtaining the consent of the third estate—free commoners who lived in the
royally chartered cities or owned the land they farmed—posed a greater difficulty.
This group had been rapidly expanding with the revival of commerce and, to an
increasing extent, that was where the money was. But how could the monarch
obtain the consent of this extensive, dispersed, and non-hierarchical mass of
commoners? The solution that developed was that they were to meet in local
groups and choose individuals who would then join the clerics and nobles in a
council or assembly that could approve additional taxation. Scholars have
identified the process by which the assembly members for the third estate were
chosen as being derived from Roman civil law—specifically the provision of quod
omnes tangit, ab omnes approbetur: “what touches all must be approved by all.”29
Roman law was being revived at this time by the glossators and
postglossators,30 so it is not surprising that a provision of this sort would have been
conceptually available to people. But it could not have been extended from civil
law settings to the fiscal management of the realm without the support of
corporativist thinking. The group of people who approved or chose the
representative had to be conceived as a juridical body, an entity that could take
such action. The representative had to be conceived as acting for a juridical entity,
of representing that entity’s collective act of agreement in a manner similar to the
action of the Church—as corpus mysticum—or the small group of leading nobles.
This was a tremendous advance, one that was unknown to Ancient Greece or
Rome.31
Business corporations followed a somewhat different, but not unrelated, path.
Here too, the concept of representation proved useful, but it was representation of
capital contributions, not human individuals. A royal charter could grant particular
markets to an individual or group of individuals, producing a corporate entity not
very different from the individual who was granted a “farm” by the king to manage
a particular royal property, collect taxes in a given area, or raise troops for military
28. MAGNA CARTA 448, 461 (J.C. Holt ed., 1992).
29. OTTO GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE 61–67 (Frederic Maitland, trans., 1958);
ARTHUR MONAHAN, CONSENT, COERCION AND LIMIT: THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF PARLIAMENTARY
DEMOCRACY 97–133 (McGill-Queen’s Univ. Press 1st ed. 1987); GAINES POST, STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL LEGAL
THOUGHT: PUBLIC LAW AND THE STATE, 1100–1322 (1964); Gaines Post, A Roman Legal Theory of Consent:
Quid Omnes Tagit, 1950 WISC. L. REV. 66 (1950).
30. See PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY (Cambridge Univ. Press 1st ed. 1999); see also
HERMANN KANTOROWICZ, STUDIES IN THE GLOSSATORS OF THE ROMAN LAW: NEWLY DISCOVERED WRITINGS
OF THE 12TH CENTURY (1969).
31. See PAUL CARTLEDGE, DEMOCRACY: A LIFE 293–98 (2018) (describing the history of democracy
focusing on Ancient Greece).
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purposes. As time went on, larger enterprises that required capital were formed,
and capital was raised by issuing stock—shares in the profits of the enterprise.
Because these enterprises were conceived as juridical persons capable of
independent action, elected representatives of the stockholders could manage these
enterprises.32 This organizational structure is not a democracy of any kind, and in
fact pre-dated democracy by several centuries. But it shared democracy’s
conceptual origin in the corporativist thinking of the Medieval Era.
III. REPRESENTATION AS THE MECHANISM OF POPULAR POLITICAL
SOVEREIGNTY
As is apparent from the foregoing account, political representation did not
develop as a feature of democracy. Quite the contrary, it was a device that
centralizing monarchs used to expand their power, to obtain the economic
resources that they needed to displace the Church, subdue the nobility, and—of
course—make war against each other.33 This device became vestigial in France
and Spain due to the absolutism of the 16th and 17th centuries, when the monarchs
were able to sweep feudal limits on their authority aside and impose whatever taxes
the economy and the populace would bear.34 In England, however, representation
flourished, and the Stuarts’ attempted absolutism ended in a revolution
spearheaded by Parliament—the representative assembly.35 There followed a
dictatorship, a restoration of the Stuart monarchy, another revolution,36 and then
the gradual expansion of Parliament’s role in governance.37 By the end of the 18th

32. See RON HARRIS, GOING THE DISTANCE: EURASIAN TRADE AND THE RISE OF THE BUSINESS
CORPORATION 1400 TO 1700 (2020); SICARD, supra note 16, at 146–99.
33. The idea that a representative assembly might be connected in some manner to the concept of democracy
seems to have been developed for the first time during the English Civil War by a group of radical republican
writers, notably James Harrington, Algernon Sidney, and Henry Neville. See CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE WORLD
TURNED UPSIDE DOWN: RADICAL IDEAS DURING THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION (2021). Harrington, for example,
offered the following prescription: “Democracy . . . consists of distinct tribes . . . subordinate to a senate
consisting of not above three hundred senators, and to a popular assembly not under a thousand deputies, each of
these . . . readily changeable in one third part upon annual elections in the tribes, the senate having the debate,
and the popular assembly the result of the whole commonwealth.” James Harrington, A System of Politics, in THE
COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA AND A SYSTEM OF POLITICS 261 (J.G.A. Pocock, ed., 1992).
34. See JOHN LYNCH, SPAIN UNDER THE HABSBURGS, VOL. 1: EMPIRE AND ABSOLUTISM, 1516–1598 (New
York Univ. Press 2nd ed. 1984); GEOFFREY TREASURE, SEVENTEENTH CENTURY FRANCE: A STUDY IN
ABSOLUTISM (1967).
35. See generally MICHAEL BRADDICK, GOD’S FURY, ENGLAND’S FIRE: A NEW HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH
CIVIL WARS (2009); DAVID R. COMO, RADICAL PARLIAMENTARIANS AND THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR (2018).
36. EVELINE CRUICKSHANKS, THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION (2000); STEVE PINCUS, 1688: THE FIRST
MODERN REVOLUTION (2011); EDWARD VALLANCE, THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION: 1688: BRITAIN’S FIGHT FOR
LIBERTY (2008).
37. The central figure in this process was Robert Walpole, generally regarded as Britain’s first prime
minister. See JEREMY BLACK, WALPOLE IN POWER (2001); BRIAN W. HILL, SIR ROBERT WALPOLE: SOLE AND
PRIME MINISTER (Penguin 1st ed. 1989); JOHN MORLEY, WALPOLE: THE FIRST PRIME MINISTER OF BRITAIN
(Lume Books 2015) (1889).
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century, that process had produced a regime that we recognize as a democracy—
one which revolutionary governments in France and the newly formed United
States quickly paralleled.
Thus, political representation—although originally an instrument of
monarchic centralization—evolved into a democratic system in England, which
was then recruited by revolutionaries in France and the United States. By the 19th
century, representation had become the essential feature, and perhaps the defining
feature, of democratic government as that mode of governance became prevalent
in Western society. Again, this development constituted a distinctive and
momentous development. The approach was unknown to Ancient Greek
democracy, certainly the principal predecessor of our current political system. In
Athens, policy was set by an assembly of all citizens—what we now describe as
direct, as opposed to representative democracy—while magistrates were chosen
by lot.38 In fact, the collapse of the Roman Empire might be at least partially
attributed to its failure to develop a system of representation as a means of
connecting people in its vast territory with its central government.
Once representation had been identified as the means of establishing
democratic rule in modern Western regimes, the scope of the franchise became a
matter of intense controversy. At the time that the transition to democracy occurred
in Britain, many members of the House of Commons came from diminutive
districts known as pocket boroughs because the handful of voters were in the
pocket of a local magnate, or rotten boroughs because the magnate had secured
that handful’s support through various forms of bribery.39 These districts, often
with fewer than one thousand voters, elected the same two members of Parliament
as burgeoning industrial cities such as Birmingham and Manchester, whose voting
populations numbered in the tens of thousands.40 Edmund Burke famously argued
38. In the Ecclesia (Assembly), which at least in theory made the major decisions, all citizens were eligible
and everyone’s vote counted equally. The military commanders were elected, with one coming from each of
Attic’s ten tribes, but according to Aristotle, and probably the Athenians as well, election was an oligarchic
practice, at odds with democratic governance. In any case, it was the Ecclesia that elected all ten, and the
expectation was that they would constitute an effective general staff, not that they would speak for their tribe of
origin. Although the members of the Boule (Council) that set the agenda for the Ecclesia and implemented its
decisions came from each of the tribes in equal numbers, they were chosen by lot and the Boule was structured
according to a principle of successive authority, rather than constituting a deliberative body with input from each
tribe. See ARISTOTLE, THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION (P.J. Rhodes, trans., 2002) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE,
CONSTITUTION]; Aristotle, Politics, in THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 476–502 (Benjamin Jowett, trans., 1952). See
generally CARTLEDGE, supra note 31, at 77–90, 105–22. Scholars largely agree that The Athenian Constitution
was not written by Aristotle, but rather is the one surviving example of a series of studies of Greek polis
constitutions written by his students.
39. DEREK HIRST, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE? VOTERS AND VOTING IN ENGLAND UNDER THE
EARLY STUARTS 29–43,112–22 (1976); CHARLES SEYMOUR, ELECTORAL REFORM IN ENGLAND AND WALES 7–
44 (1915).
40. SEYMOUR, supra note 39, at 45–76, 165–97; see id. at 166 (“In the small nomination boroughs . . . the
power of the patron was so complete that the few votes cast could be secured without bribery. But in the larger
boroughs, where there was something like an independent electorate, that independence was regarded as merely
an opportunity for selling the vote to the highest bidder.”).
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that representatives of these rustic rotten boroughs provided “virtual
representation” to the residents of the industrial cities,41 but this did not convince
or mollify the city people. Their demands for proportionate representation became
one of the most divisive issues in 19th century British politics, bringing the nation
to the threshold of social revolution and generating two reform bills (1832 and
1867) that ameliorated the problem.42
A closely related issue involved the property qualification. In 1830, when
William IV became the first truly constitutional monarch of what was by then the
United Kingdom, only some 300,000 of a nation with 16 million people and 6
million adult men—could vote in parliamentary elections.43 To say that property
restrictions imposed this limit is perhaps an understatement. In fact, in a manner
somewhat similar to corporate governance, it was ownership of property, not
citizenship, that entitled a person to vote. A person who owned property in a
particular district could vote there, even if he lived somewhere else, and one who
owned property in multiple constituencies could vote in each of them. In the socalled burgage boroughs, the vote belonged to the occupants of specified properties
that a candidate could purchase and rent out to grateful tenants.44 Defending such
arrangements, the Duke of Wellington, prime minister of the Tory government in
power, inaccurately but revealingly asserted that a “democracy has never been
established in any part of the world that it has not immediately declared war against
property.”45
In both France and the United States, the idea that the nation was composed of
human beings, not property owners, and that these human beings should count
equally, was part of their revolutionary ideologies. France, in the midst of the
Revolution, instituted universal manhood suffrage for the elections to the National
Convention, but the conservative regime that followed Napoleon’s defeat enacted
property restrictions that outdid Britain by limiting the franchise for legislative
elections to 90,000 men, out of a population of over 26 million, which increased
after the Revolution of 1830 to 241,000.46 The Revolution of 1848, self-

41. Edmund Burke, Speech at Mr. Burke’s Arrival in Bristol, in THE PORTABLE EDMUND BURKE 155 (Isaac
Kramnick, ed., 1999); see HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 168–189 (1967)
(discussing Burke’s theory of representation, including the trustee versus conduit idea and virtual representation);
Paul Langford, Property and Virtual Representation in Eighteenth Century England, 31 HIST. J. 83 (1988)
(discussing the way in which Parliament, in the years preceding Burke, was able to conduct political debate
despite the disproportionate representation of various constituencies).
42. WINSTON CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH SPEAKING PEOPLES, VOL. 4: THE GREAT
DEMOCRACIES 43–50 (1958); SEYMOUR, supra note 39, at 57–76, 234–79; G.M. TREVELYAN, HISTORY OF
ENGLAND, VOL. III, at 172–79 (1952).
43. PAUL JOHNSON, THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN 403 (HarperCollins 1st ed. 1991).
44. Edward Porritt, The Revolt Against Feudalism in England, 9 POL. SCI. Q. 64 (1894).
45. CHURCHILL, supra note 42, at 49.
46. ALFRED COBBAN, A HISTORY OF MODERN FRANCE, VOL. 2, at 78, 98 (1961).

49

2021 / Extending Democracy to Corporate Governance and Beyond
consciously modeled on its predecessor in so many ways, restored universal
manhood suffrage, but the dictatorship of Louis Napoleon turned French elections
into a charade—a political game where the result was known in advance and
virtually the entire panoply of manipulative techniques was used to make the clues
difficult for the voters to figure out.47 Still another revolution was required before
the people could deploy the revolutionary principle of universal manhood suffrage
in genuine elections.48
In the United States, the Framers of the Constitution were so concerned with
establishing the machinery for the indirect election of the President and Senators
that they had little energy to devote to defining the franchise for Representatives—
the only directly elected positions—and left the matter to the states.49 Many states
imposed property restrictions but these states gradually abandoned such
restrictions in the succeeding decades,50 probably as a result of the egalitarian spirit
that Tocqueville observed. 51 But countervailing tendencies, such as the exclusion
of “paupers” who were receiving poor relief, arose and continued for substantial
lengths of time before states finally abandoned them.52
The franchise was restricted to men until the 20th century, with New Zealand
being the first democratic nation to extend it to women in 1893.53 Part of the
justification was that the vote should be exercised by heads of households, or by
fully independent persons, but the fact that widows and unmarried women—some
of whom possessed substantial property—could not legally vote suggests that
outright discrimination and misogyny were at least equally operative. It is not
difficult to link the extension of the franchise to women’s changing position in
civil society, but these changes were not alone sufficient to ensure women would
have having the right to vote. The agitation of the suffrage movement—with
women simultaneously exerting political pressure and demonstrating their capacity

47. ROGER PRICE, THE FRENCH SECOND EMPIRE: AN ANATOMY OF POLITICAL POWER 95–133 (2001).
48. CHARLES SOWERWINE, FRANCE SINCE 1870: CULTURE, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 25–39 (3rd ed. 2018).
49. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
50. CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY 117–280 (1960). See
generally Donald Ratcliffe, The Right to Vote and the Rise of Democracy, 1787–1828, 33 J. EARLY REPUBLIC
219 (2013).
51. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop, trans.,
2000).
52. See generally Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early Republic, 41 STAN. L. REV. 335
(1989).
53. PATRICIA GRIMSHAW, WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE IN NEW ZEALAND (1988); Francisco O. Ramirez, et al., The
Changing Logic of Political Citizenship: Cross-National Acquisition of Women’s Suffrage Rights, 1890 to 1990,
62 AM. SOC. REV. 735, 743–44 (1997) (listing nations that granted women suffrage between 1890 and 1990 with
year when suffrage was first granted and arguing that women’s suffrage became an international norm that
overcame the particularized conditions in many nations over the course of the twentieth century).
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for independent action—was necessary before nations finally allowed them to
vote,54 in some cases as late as 1944 in France and 1971 in Switzerland.55
Burke’s assertion that representatives of the fusty rustics or itinerant
opportunists in Britain’s pocket and rotten boroughs could provide virtual
representation for the crowded, struggling populations of its industrial cities would
seem implausible to the point of mindless traditionalism or outright corruption had
he not demonstrated his sanity and good faith by acknowledging that no
representative from England could provide such representation for the American
colonists.56 The 19th century would see that same assertion lead to independence
for most of the colonial regimes in the Americas, which no longer believed that
their founding nation would represent their interests.57 In the 20th century,
colonized peoples in Africa and Asia reached that conclusion as well.58 To be sure,
not all the liberated colonies became democracies, but a reasonable number have
done so,59 and several now have governments that are more democratic than the
United States according to the independent rating agencies.60 In any case, it is clear
that none of these regimes could be counted as democracies unless they had gained
their independence.
54. HAROLD L. SMITH, THE BRITISH WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE CAMPAIGN, 1866–1928 (2nd ed. 2009). See
generally ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, SUFFRAGE: WOMEN’S LONG BATTLE FOR THE VOTE (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2020); DORIS WEATHERFORD, VICTORY FOR THE VOTE: THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE AND THE
CENTURY THAT FOLLOWED (2020).
55. Ramirez, et al., supra note 53, at 744.
56. Edmund Burke, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents; Speech on American Taxation;
Speech on Conciliation with the Colonies; Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol on American Affairs, in EDMUND
BURKE, THE IMPERATIVES OF EMPIRE, AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: AN INTERPRETATION 1, 85, 143, 211
(H.G. Callaway, ed., 2016); BURKE, supra note 41, at 233–93.
57. MARSHALL C. EAKIN, THE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA: COLLISION OF CULTURES 149–210 (2007).
See generally JOHN CHARLES CHASTEEN, AMERICANOS: LATIN AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE
(2008).
58. See generally, e.g., BIPAN CHANDRA, ET AL., INDIA’S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE (1989); LARRY
COLLINS & DOMINIQUE LAPIERRE, FREEDOM AT MIDNIGHT (Book Club Associates 1st ed. 1975); see also
SHIRAZ DURRANI, KENYA’S WAR OF INDEPENDENCE: MAU MAU AND ITS LEGACY OF RESISTANCE TO
COLONIALISM AND IMPERIALISM, 1948–1990 (2018). Algeria, due its particularly difficult struggle for
independence and the inspirational character of the writers it both generated and attracted, played a particularly
important role in framing the defeat of colonialism as a liberation movement. See generally JEFFREY JAMES
BYRNE, MECCA OF REVOLUTION: ALGERIA, DECOLONIZATION AND THE THIRD WORLD ORDER (Oxford Univ.
Press 1st ed. 2016); MATTHEW CONNELLY, A DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION: ALGERIA’S FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE
AND THE ORIGINS OF THE POST-COLD WAR ERA (2002); FRANTZ FANON, A DYING COLONIALISM (Haakon
Chevalier, trans., 1965); ROBERT MALLEY, THE CALL FROM ALGERIA: THIRD WORLDISM, REVOLUTION, AND
THE TURN TO ISLAM (Univ. of California Press 1st ed. 1996).
59. EAKIN, supra note 57, at 269–376. See generally JEFF HAYNES, DEMOCRACY IN THE DEVELOPING
WORLD: AFRICA, ASIA, LATIN AMERICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST (Polity 1st ed. 2001); MARTIN MEREDITH, THE
FATE OF AFRICA: A HISTORY OF THE CONTINENT SINCE INDEPENDENCE (2011).
60. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX 2020: IN SICKNESS AND IN HEALTH? (2021);
FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2021: DEMOCRACY UNDER SIEGE (2021). The Economist
Intelligence Unit ranked Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay ahead of the U.S., as well as Australia, Canada, and New
Zealand, the British settler colonies that achieved effective independence in the nineteenth or twentieth century.
Other large post-colonial regimes that are regarded as democracies by the two organizations, albeit with defects,
include Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Ghana, South Africa, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
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The principle that underlies the extension of voting rights to urban populations,
men without property, women, and colonized peoples is not difficult to discern. It
is popular political sovereignty: the belief that everyone should have a voice in the
democratic process, that no one should be dependent on another to speak for him
or her. In a modern nation state—as opposed to Athens, or better still the
diminutive polities that were more typical of Ancient Greece—people cannot
speak directly, of course.61 Political representatives—products of that great
political innovation of Western society that began as an instrumentality of
monarchic rule and evolved into the defining feature of the governments that
displaced that rule—must transmit the voices of the people. Thus, the principle,
more strictly stated, is that everyone must have a voice in the selection of the
representatives who rule in their name.
An extension of this principle that has become widely accepted as democratic
governments evolved is that everyone should have an equal voice in the selection
of representatives. This does not mean that everyone’s vote must have an equal
effect. That is a much too demanding standard, one that is likely unachievable in
practice and may not even be possible in theory.62 Rather, the idea of the equality
applies to the input, not the output. Everyone casts the same number of votes (often
one, but not necessarily), even if some of the votes cast are more determinative of
the result due to districting, counting methods, or demographic patterns. The
normative principle is that every person acts independently of any other voter and
is at least juridically—if not pragmatically—equal.

61. See CARTLEDGE, supra note 31, at 145–69. See generally ERIC W. ROBINSON, DEMOCRACY BEYOND
ATHENS: POPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE GREEK CLASSICAL AGE (2015).
62. Procedures for electing members of a legislature vary, and each variation tends to favor one group of
voters over another. The most basic distinction lies between single member and multi-member districts. Single
member districts are now used in the United Kingdom and many British-influenced democracies such as the
United States. In most cases, whoever gets the most votes wins, a method generally described by the horse-racing
term “first past the post.” Most modern democratic nations use proportional representation. At one extreme, as in
Israel, the Netherlands, and Slovakia, all members of the legislature are chosen at large; more commonly, the
nation is sub-divided into districts electing a number of representatives that starts at two and can reach as high as
70. See generally AREND LIPHART, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND PARTY SYSTEMS: A STUDY OF TWENTY-SEVEN
DEMOCRACIES, 1945–1990 (1994); AREND LIPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT: FORMS AND
PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIX DEMOCRACIES (1999). If proportional representation is chosen, a further decision
is needed to translate the voters’ choices into seats. Suppose one party has received 48% of the votes, in a threemember district, the second has received 22%, and the third has received 17%. Should the first party receive two
seats, since it obtained more than twice as many votes as the second, with the second party receiving one and the
third party none? Or should each party receive one seat? The two most common methods for making this
determination are the D’Hondt Divisors method and the Hare Quota and Largest Remainders method (HQLR),
both named after the political theorists who provided definitive descriptions of them. While both are more
favorable to minor parties than single member districts, Hare is more favorable to them than D’Hondt. See
MICHAEL GALLAGHER, THE POLITICS OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 535–97 (2005); Eric S. Herron, et al.,
Terminology and Basic Rules of Electoral Systems, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS (2018);
PITKIN, supra note 41, at 61–66. All these methods are valid; they are not abuses like gerrymandering or voter
suppression. But a choice among them, or similar variations must be made, and these choices will alter the impact
of individual votes.
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The remaining exclusions from the franchise can be explained in terms of the
rationale for the progressive expansion of the franchise, although they can be
challenged as well on this same basis. The right to vote is not a human right, like
freedom of conscience or freedom of speech, but a political right: a right of
participation in an organized governmental entity. It depends on the dual concept
of corporatism that developed in the Middle Ages. First, the state must be
conceived as a juridical body, an entity with specific contours that is capable of
action. Second, the constituency of each representative must be conceived a
juridical body, an entity that can choose a single person or small group of persons
to act in its interest. Thus, voting is limited to people recognized as members of
the state and members of the constituency. These are the people who are entitled
to have a voice, and it is they who therefore speak for themselves. But questions
may arise regarding resident aliens who are not recognized members of another
political entity,63 an issue that implicates more general rules about naturalization
or admission into the community.64 The defensible basis for excluding nonmembers of the community from the franchise is not that others are speaking for
them, but that they are not entitled to speak in that community.
Children are a second notable exclusion from the franchise and unlike aliens,
they are members of the community who the state denies their own voice in the
polity. The rationale is familiar, but again subject to challenge. First, children
below a certain age are in fact incompetent to make political judgments and express
their views. In that case, however, a boundary must be drawn, and as excluded
individuals approach the boundary, the rationale will cease to apply to an
increasing number of them. This would be true for any boundary however, and the
cost of making individualized determinations of competence is typically regarded
as prohibitive.65 Second, the exclusion of children is non-invidious because every
single person who is currently an adult was once a child, and excluded from the
franchise on that basis for the exact same length of time every other person.
Third—and most relevant for present purposes—society considers enfranchised
63. See generally Ludvig Beckman, Citizenship and Voting Rights: Should Resident Aliens Vote?, 10
CITIZENSHIP STUD. 153 (2006). The argument is that, at some point, resident aliens are members of the
community, even if the nation’s naturalization laws deny them citizenship. But no one argues that tourists should
have the right to vote in the place that they are visiting.
64. In general, the condition of statelessness is a serious human rights issue in the modern world, particularly
in light of the Westphalian system of international relations that divides the entirety of the habitable territory of
the planet into sovereign states. See generally BRAD K. BLITZ, STATELESSNESS, PROTECTION AND EQUALITY
(2009); Carol A. Batchelor, Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status, 10 INT’L J. REFUGEE
L. 156 (1998).
65. This point can be challenged, however. See DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD
136–44 (Routledge 3d. ed. 2014); Eric Wiland, Should Children Have the Right to Vote?, in THE PALGRAVE
HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC POLICY 215 (David Boonin, ed., 2018). See generally Steven Lecce,
Should Democracy Grow Up? Children and Voting Rights, 9 INTERGENERATIONAL JUST. REV. 133 (2009); John
Wall, Children and Youth Should Have the Right to Vote. An Argument for Proxy-Claim Suffrage, 24 CHILDREN,
YOUTH & ENVIRONMENTS 108 (2014).
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adults fully adequate to speak for children because they will make decisions based
on their own children’s interests. Of course, some adults do not have children, but
virtually all children have at least one parent responsible for their welfare.66 Our
society has chosen to delegate almost unregulated authority over children to their
parents, on the theory that parents can be relied on to act in their children’s best
interests. Such broad authority is generally regarded as encompassing the right to
speak for the child on matters of political representation.67
A third excluded group are incompetent adults—those society judges too
mentally or emotionally impaired to understand what is at stake in the election or
perhaps what it means to cast a vote. This is also a matter of controversy because
many American states have enacted laws that embody outmoded or prejudiced
ideas about mental disability.68 For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that
any normatively valid restriction of this sort must define disability as a person’s
inability to care for themselves and function in the world as an independent being.
The denial of the right to vote for such persons is thus based on the same rationale
as exclusion of children from the franchise; namely, that our legal system as a
whole has determined that the persons in question cannot act for themselves and
thus must have some other person act in their stead.69 One other group of people
who some governments in the United States often exclude from the franchise are
convicted felons and ex-felons.70 The rationale for felons is again the same; the
law has determined that they must be under another person’s supervision and
prohibited from acting on their own. The rationale for excluding ex-felons from

66. At present, there are about 73 million children in the United States. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, https://www.childstats.gov/americaschildren/tables/pop1.asp (last visited Aug. 25, 2021)
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). The number of children who are not under parental
supervision and are in foster care is 443,000, or only about 0.6 percent. Moreover, it can be argued that foster
care itself embodies the policy that every child should be under the supervision of a parent or surrogate parent.
67. On this basis, it can be argued that parents should have the right to exercise a proxy vote on behalf of
their children. For a discussion of this issue, see generally Robert W. Bennett, Should Parents Be Given Extra
Votes on Account of Their Children? Toward a Conversational Understanding of American Democracy, 94 NW.
U. L. REV. 503 (1999); Jane Rutherford, One Child, One Vote: Proxies for Parents, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1463
(1998).
68. See Paul S. Applebaum, “I Vote, I Count”: Mental Disabilities and the Right to Vote, 51 PSYCHIATRIC
SERV. 849, 850 (2000) (“Persons with mental disabilities, though, are one of the few groups still singled out for
special treatment at the polls. As of 1997, 44 states had language in their constitutions, statutes, or case law barring
voting by some subgroups of persons with mental illness or mental retardation.”); Sally Balch Hume & Paul S.
Applebaum, Defining and Assessing Capacity to Vote: The Effect of Mental Impairment on the Right to Vote, 38
MCGEORGE L. REV. 931, 936–45 (2007) (summarizing state laws regarding rights of mentally disabled people to
vote).
69. A countervailing argument is that voting is a socially integrative activity that can be beneficial for those
with mental health problems. See generally Applebaum, supra note 68; Michael Nash, Voting as a Means of
Inclusion for People with Mental Illness, 9 J. PSYCHIATRIC & MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 697 (2002).
70. See generally JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2006); Pamela S. Karlen, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and
the Debate Over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1137 (2004).
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the franchise need not detain us. There is no such rationale, and this current practice
of many American states is a massive human rights violation.
IV. THE MECHANISM OF REPRESENTATION AS THE BASIS FOR POPULAR
ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY
We are now in a position to extend the corporatist thinking described in Part I
and the concept of representation described in Part II from the political to the
economic realm. Political theorists who envision this extension have typically
focused on wealth distribution. For some, such as Aristotle71 or the Duke of
Wellington,72 the possibility that democracy would demand or encourage a certain
level of redistribution has been a source of grave concern. In fact, the issue
flummoxed Aristotle so much that it disrupted his usual clarity of thought. In the
Politics, it is clear he regards “democracy” as a perverted form of government,73
but unclear whether he is defining it as the rule of the many or the rule of the poor.74
Perhaps his account can be treated as coherent if the majority of people in an
Ancient Greek city state can be plausibly regarded as poor, but our current levels
of material wealth lead us to view the poor as a minority.
For many modern writers, the possible connection between democracy and
wealth distribution is an aspiration rather than a danger. One of the more extreme
proposals comes from John Rawls, who derives both democratic government and
his fairness principle from a theory of justice. The fairness principle would only
allow disparities in wealth if they improved the position of the poorest people in
the society.75 A more moderate and widely endorsed view is that democracy
requires sufficient redistribution of wealth to ensure that the minimal needs of
every member of society are satisfied.76 The rationale is that people cannot
participate in government—they cannot effectively exercise their right to vote or
take advantage of their opportunity to engage in more active participation—if they
are hungry, homeless, sick, or uneducated. Hegel, although not a proponent of
71. Aristotle, Politics, supra note 38, at 491–93, 506–07.
72. See CHURCHILL, supra note 42, at 49.
73. Aristotle divides the rule of the many, like the rule of one or the rule of the few, into a virtuous and
perverted form. In the virtuous form, which he calls politea, the many rule in the interest of the common good. In
the perverted form they rule in their own interest only, and in that case they loot the wealthy for their own benefit.
Aristotle, Politics, supra note 38, at 278–79.
74. Although Aristotle defines democracy as the perverted form of the rule of the many when he presents
his tripartite division (rule of one, rule of the few, rule of the many), see id. at 278–79. He presents another
definition based on the distribution of wealth, where he defines democracy as the rule of the poor. Id. at 277.
75. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE §§ 11–13 (Belknap Press 2nd rev. ed. 1999).
76. See generally GANESH SITARAMIN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION: WHY
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY THREATENS OUR REPUBLIC (2018); JOE SOSS, REMAKING AMERICA: DEMOCRACY AND
PUBLIC POLICY IN AN AGE OF INEQUALITY (2010); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER (2006); GORAN THERBORN, INEQUALITY
AND THE LABYRINTHS OF DEMOCRACY (2020); ELIZABETH WARREN, THIS FIGHT IS OUR FIGHT: HOW TO SAVE
AMERICA’S MIDDLE CLASS (2017).
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democracy, argued that ownership of property was an essential first step in an
individual’s rational development: that it provides the ability to define one’s
personal will by embodying that will in the possession of objects.77
Scholars have written extensively about both the dangers that democracy poses
to property and that lack of property poses for democracy. For present purposes,
the important point is that none of the proposed connections or conflicts between
the two are organic; that is, none assert a basic structural linkage between
democratic governance and wealth distribution—either for better or worse.
Empirical arguments based on the performance of actual democracies are not
supported by historical fact. Contrary to Aristotle’s confused concern and the Duke
of Wellington’s hysterical pronouncement, democracies have hardly ever engaged
in extreme—or even extensive—redistribution of wealth. On the other hand,
democracies seem able to survive despite the resulting disparities. According to
the World Bank’s GINI Index,78 a standard measure of income inequality, the top
ten percent of nations that have the most equitable wealth distribution include
Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands, among the most democratic nations in the
world, but also Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Algeria. In contrast, the bottom ten
percent in income equality include South Africa, Belize, and Brazil—which are
democracies—but also the Central African Republic, Mozambique, and Honduras.
The connection that political theorists attempt to make between democracy
and wealth distribution seems equally weak from a theoretical perspective. Wealth
distribution is a policy that elected representatives determine. There is no obvious
reason why either they or the voters should systematically favor any particular
approach. If the voters or their representatives are seen as motivated primarily by
self-interest, the voters will decide based on whether they think that redistribution
will be to their benefit or detriment—and not necessarily in favor of greater
equality. It follows that the representatives will decide based on what policy will
appeal to the voters, which again does not necessarily lead to economic equality.79
If the voters and representatives also decide based on ideological or second order
77. G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 38–42 (T.M. Knox, trans., 1962). See generally JEREMY
WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1991) (concluding that the implication of Hegel’s view is that
every member of the state or community should own at least some property).
78. GINI Index (World Bank Estimate) Country Ranking, WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH GROUP,
https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/SI.POV.GINI/rankings (last visited Aug. 25, 2021) (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review).
79. See generally THOMAS FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS: HOW CONSERVATIVES WON THE
HEART OF AMERICA (2005) (showing Americans in economically-depressed areas that would benefit from
government programs regularly vote against their own self-interest because they have been persuaded to pay more
attention to social values issues like abortion and gay culture); HEATHER MCGEE, THE SUM OF US: WHAT RACISM
COSTS EVERYONE AND HOW WE CAN PROSPER TOGETHER (2021) (arguing that racist attitudes lead people to
oppose collective undertakings that would benefit them); JONATHAN M. METZL, DYING OF WHITENESS: HOW THE
POLITICS OF RACIAL RESENTMENT IS KILLING AMERICA’S HEARTLAND (2020) (concluding that voters in
backward areas who need improved medical care oppose federal programs because of their ideological opposition
to providing assistance to minorities that they consider undeserving).
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considerations—which seems more likely—there will be even greater variability.
Rawls’ argument is based on our intuitions about fairness, which he interrogates
by means of the original position.80 The argument has great intuitive appeal with
respect to minimal needs: few people would want a society where they were at risk
that such needs would not be met. But his fairness principle, and even more
moderate approaches to equalization, seem to lack that same appeal: many people
might prefer to take a chance at having more than average wealth. Similarly, the
connection between wealth and participation is only persuasive with respect to
debilitating hunger, extreme illness, or total destitution. There seems to be no
reason why poor people cannot mobilize to demand more equal treatment.
The mutual origin of our modern conception of the state and the business
corporation in Medieval corporatist thinking provides a more direct, organic link
between democracy and the economy. Rather than focusing on wealth distribution,
it addresses corporate organization. Medieval thinkers conceived of the state as a
juridical person, capable of action. They saw this person as composed of the three
traditional estates: the nobility, the clergy, and the commoners. They then
proceeded to treat groups of commoners, such as city residents or free, non-noble
landowners, as juridical persons who could act through a representative. This dual
conception of corporate entities led directly to our current system of representative
democracy when the authority of the first two estates was overthrown and the
representatives of the common people became the controlling force in
government.81
That same conception can be directly applied to our economic system as well.
We already conceive of our dominant business organizations as corporate entities.
As Eric Orts points out, it is important to keep in mind that this is a legal
construct.82 Corporations are persons with their own rights and ability to act, but
80. RAWLS, supra note 75, §§ 4, 20–30. This is not Sandel’s argument that placing people behind the veil
of ignorance detaches them from their social context and thus distorts their preferences. See MICHAEL SANDEL,
JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 140–66 (2010). Rawls is not subject to this criticism because he is
addressing his readers in their social context and using the veil of ignorance as a device by which they can
interrogate their own views about justice. The problem with the fairness principle is that idea that every increase
in wealth, no matter how justly earned, must benefit the poorest members of society, or be taxed away, seems
unlikely to emerge from that interrogation.
81. In England, this occurred with Reformation, which subordinated the English Church to civil authorities,
see DIARMAID MCCULLOCH, THE LATER REFORMATION IN ENGLAND 1547–1603 (Red Globe Press 2nd ed.
2000), and the gradual reduction in the legislative authority of the House of Lords, from a coordinate branch of
the legislature to a ceremonial and judicial body, see WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION (Oxford
Univ. Press reissue ed. 2009) (1872); Corinne Comstock Weston, Salisbury and the Lords, 1868–1895, in PEERS,
POLITICS AND POWER, 1603–1911, at 461 (Clyve Jones and David Lewis Jones, eds., 1986). In France it occurred
when the Estates General was reconstituted as the National Assembly in the first stages of the French Revolution.
See SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS: A CHRONICLE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 428–70 (1990); TIMOTHY TACKETT,
BECOMING A REVOLUTIONARY: THE DEPUTIES OF THE FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE EMERGENCE OF
A REVOLUTIONARY CULTURE 1789–90, at 117–208 (1996).
82. ERIC ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 27–52 (2013). (“Law recognizes firms
as organizational ‘entities’ with rights and responsibilities that are enforceable in court—thus endowing them
with ‘legal personality.’ . . . At the same time, these organizational persons should be recognized to possess
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the law determines the nature and scope of these rights, just as in the Middle Ages
when the kings granted corporate charters. We can also view the employees of the
corporation as a legal entity capable of acting through chosen representatives—
just as we view political constituencies. With this emendation, we can then use law
to produce a model of the corporation that serves the same purpose in the economic
realm as democracy serves in the political realm.
As democracy has evolved, our concept of representation has expanded until
it includes all competent adults. The idea behind this expansion is that every
competent adult should have an equal voice in determining the way that they are
governed. Extended to the economic realm, this principle provides that every
employee should have an equal voice in determining their conditions of
employment. As in the political sphere, the only way to achieve this when large
institutions are involved is through the process of representation. Thus, the
principle is that all people who work in large organizations should have a voice in
determining their conditions of employment by choosing representatives who
manage the corporation and determine its policies toward its employees.83 This is
the basic conception of popular economic sovereignty.
The purposes of both popular political and popular economic sovereignty are
the same. Their positive purpose is to enable individuals to determine, to at least
some significant extent, the policies and practices of institutions that exercise
extensive control over their lives. We need not succumb to all the grandiose clichés
of self-government—the idea that these institutions are, or could be, fully or
primarily controlled by those they govern. The goal in both cases—the existing
election of political leaders and the proposed election of corporate leadership—is
to grant some measure of control and provide otherwise powerless individuals with
at least some feeling of personal autonomy. To be sure, the state possesses a greater
range of authority and more symbolic significance, so exercising control of it is
arguably more important for the individual. On the other hand, an employer often
exercises a more direct and immediate authority over the individual’s life, and its
smaller size and range of action is likely to provide employees with a greater sense
of control when they elect the corporation’s leaders. Again, this is a direct
equivalence. The extension of democratic principles to the economic realm is
serving the same purpose: granting autonomy and—using the same mechanism—
representation.

important legal responsibilities as well as legal privileges.”).
83. Some corporations, as well as the non-corporate employment settings to be considered in the next
section, are small enough so that their employees can dispense with representation and control the firm directly.
This is, of course, analogous to the direct democracy that was used by Greek city states and that they, and
Aristotle, regarded as the only form of democracy. See generally ARISTOTLE, CONSTITUTION; see Aristotle,
Politics, supra note 38, at 476–502; CARTLEDGE, supra note 31, at 77–90, 105–22. The issue will be further
discussed in notes 95–96, 108 infra.
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The negative purpose of both mechanisms is to protect individuals from
oppression and provide them with a fair and just environment in which to live their
lives. The idea is that those who exercise control over individuals are chosen by
those individuals and are thereby constrained from engaging in harsh and
oppressive practices. It would be difficult to say whether the state or the
corporation is the greater engine of potential oppression. The state can deprive
people of their basic liberties—such as the right to speak or worship—and impose
ultimate sanctions such as imprisonment or death. Moreover, the average person
has no viable exit option from the state’s authority. On the other hand, the more
limited oppressions to which a corporation can subject its employees occur daily
and typically exercise a more direct impact. Many people may not care very much
about expressing political opinions, but most will care a great deal about their
conditions of employment. Admittedly, workers possess an exit option, but it is
easy for people with savings or tenure to overestimate the ease with which most
people can leave a job that provides them with their livelihood. In the absence of
corporate democracy, moreover, the effect of exercising this option is only to place
themselves in the clutches of another equally oppressive employer. Here again, the
extension of political democracy to the economy is not either an analogy or a
means of practicing political skills, but the same protection of the individual
against oppression in a different setting.
Social theorists often divide society into the political realm, the economic
realm, and civil society,84 which emerges from the actions of ordinary people and
involves the complex systems of norms and beliefs that govern their daily lives.85
There are, of course, possibilities for the mistreatment or oppression of individuals
through social stigmatization or exclusion, in civil society, but it seems reasonable
to suppose that these possibilities have become attenuated in an open, mobile
society like our own. The political and economic realms, in contrast, possess
increased possibilities for oppression of the individual. In part, this is because
increasingly large institutions with greater capacity for effective intrusion into
people’s lives dominate these realms. Moreover, their complexity renders them
virtually impossible for the ordinary person to comprehend. Habermas refers to
this development as the colonization of the lifeworld.86 Democratic decision84. See JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, VOL. 2: LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM:
A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON (Thomas McCarthy, trans., 1987); TALCOTT PARSONS, THE SYSTEM OF
MODERN SOCIETIES (1971); WEBER, supra note 8.
85. See generally JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY (1992).
86. HABERMAS, supra note 84, at 301–403; see also id. at 153–97 (uncoupling of system and lifeworld).
Lifeworld is a concept that originates with Husserl’s phenomenology. See generally EDMUND HUSSERL, THE
CRISIS OF THE EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO
PHENOMENOLOGY (David Carr, trans. 1970); EDMUND HUSSERL, IDEAS: GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PURE
PHENOMENOLOGY (W.R. Boyce Gibson, trans., 1962). The lifeworld is the individual’s entire set of subjective
experiences. Information that comes from others enters the individual’s lifeworld through a process of
intersubjective communication. Habermas is arguing that in the pre-modern world, most of the forces that
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making serves as a countervailing force to these developments. It gives the
individual some measure of control over institutions in the political realm and
produces some necessity for these institutions to explain their actions to the
individual. The argument is that the institutions that dominate the economic realm
are the product of the same corporativist conception as those that dominate the
political realm, and that the same corporativist solution—the election of
representatives to exercise control of these institutions—can serve the same
purposes of granting autonomy and counteracting oppression in that setting.
V. ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY AS A PRACTICAL MEANS OF ORGANIZING OUR
ECONOMY
The idea of popular economic sovereignty has developed here as a means by
which the principles that underlie democracy—the only acceptable mode of
political organization for most people in the Western World—can be extended into
the economic realm. It has not been proposed as a means of managing businesses
more efficiently, the most common argument for corporate democracy. In the
rather abstract form above, popular economic sovereignty might appear extreme
and impractical, demanding a complete transformation of our economy, and
constituting a prescription for economic disaster. In fact, neither is the case.
Popular economic sovereignty would be a relatively limited alteration of current
practices and might well produce a more efficient and equitable economic system.
This final section will address these issues. Although the proposal is general, this
discussion will refer to conditions in the United States to simplify the discussion.
The United States ranks near the bottom among Western democracies on social
justice issues87 but is economically successful, so focusing the discussion in this
manner does not prejudice the analysis in the direction of reform.
It should be noted at the outset that popular economic sovereignty goes beyond
the scope of corporate governance. The principle that no one should be employed
operated on the individual were comprehensible to the individual. In modern times, however, the individual’s
lifeworld has been “colonized” by external forces too large to comprehend, much as an African or Asia society
that once ruled itself was controlled by a European nation during the colonial period. To take an example from
the political and economic spheres: a pre-modern European village was generally controlled by the local
landowner and the parish priest, two familiar figures whose actions were observable and comprehensible. The
modern small town is controlled by administrative agencies located in the capital, whose staff has year of
specialized training. A pre-modern conveyance was a carriage, a simple device which could be understood by
any reasonably intelligent person and repaired by the average local artisan. Modern conveyances are automobiles
with complex engines and electronic controls that can no longer be repaired even by local auto mechanics.
87. See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 60 (ranking the United States 25th on its Democracy
Index, as a “Flawed Democracy,” below every country in Western Europe except Italy, Malta and Portugal, and
also below the other British settler nations, Taiwan, Uruguay, Chile, Costa Rica, Mauritius, Japan and South
Korea); FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 60 (ranking the United States below every country in Western Europe, the
other British settler nations, the nations listed above for the Economist ranking except South Korea, with which
it is tied, and also below a number of other nations including Argentina, Belize, Croatia, the Czech Republic,
Latvia, Mongolia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and most of the island nations in the Caribbean).
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by another person—and thus depend on another person for their livelihood—
applies to all economic organizations. Corporations are the largest employers in
our economy and the most influential business entities, but there is a vast array of
smaller-scale employment relationships that are nonetheless significant and need
to be considered if the argument that economic sovereignty is plausible and
practical is to be sustained. This section will begin by discussing corporations, but
then proceed to briefly discuss other types of employment relationships.
Although popular economic sovereignty could be a means of implementing
socialism,88 it is fully compatible with capitalism as well, and would not require
any significant alteration of current ownership patterns in the American economy.
The reason lies in Berle and Means’ recognition that the modern corporation has
separated ownership from management.89 This insight leads to agency theory,
perhaps the leading account of how large corporations are managed.90 It asserts
that those who own the corporation through possession of its voting stock are
typically too numerous, too dispersed, and insufficiently knowledgeable to
actually manage the organization that they own. Very often, they own the stock
merely as an investment, viewing it as a better place to put their money than a bank
account, government bonds, real estate, or their mattress. Even when one
individual owns a majority of the voting stock and thus controls the corporation,
they will often lack either the desire or the capacity to manage it. Instead, a board
of directors—elected by the non-democratic principle that votes are conferred by
ownership of stock—manages a modern corporation. The board appoints the
principal managers of the corporation (who may or may not become members of
the board), and they in turn make the decisions regarding the operation of the
firm.91 The owners, acting directly or through the board, retain the authority to
decide its basic ownership and structure, however. They can disband the firm,
merge it into another firm, change its character by acquiring other firms, or
restructure its general approach and lines of business.
There is no reason why the appointed managers of a corporation could not be
replaced by managers elected by the corporation’s employees. This idea is not
particularly radical or exotic; extensive worker participation or management has
been implemented in a number of cases within the structure of a capitalist

88. See supra note 1 on the traditional connection between worker democracy and socialism.
89. ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932).
90. See generally Frank Easterbrook, Two Agency Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 650
(1984); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Eugene F.
Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327 (1983); Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
91. See, e.g., DAMBISA MOYO, HOW BOARDS WORK: AND HOW THEY CAN WORK BETTER IN A CHAOTIC
WORLD 61–116 (2021).
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economy.92 Worker-elected management would function here as a means of
implementing the basic principle of popular economic sovereignty—that each
person should function as an economically independent actor and no person should
be employed by another. An argument that elected representatives of a
corporation’s employees would not truly provide the employees with control of the
corporation’s management is not relevant to this discussion. The question here is
whether democracy’s underlying principle of popular political sovereignty can
extend into the economic realm in a plausible and practical manner. Whatever
defects afflict the representation process in a worker-managed firm are no
different—and possibly less severe—than those which afflict voters in a political
democracy.
Nonetheless, there are issues that arise in the process of political representation
that are worth considering in the context of corporate democracy. The most
obvious is the structure of representation. One possibility is that the entirety of the
employees would elect representatives at large, equivalent to nations such as Israel
that elect all their legislators at large.93 A large and geographically dispersed
corporation could use the principle of geographic subdivision that is most common
in politics and have the employees in each factory or regional office elect either
one representative using first past the post, or several using proportional
representation. Another possibility, much easier to manage for a corporation than
a nation, is to have employees vote by functional category, with for example,
clerical employees, supervisors, salespersons, and factory floor workers voting as
a group. The particular arrangement can often affect the results, but all these
options readily fulfill the basic principle of popular employee sovereignty. Every
employee would have an equal voice in the management of the corporation, thus
serving the positive purpose of representative democracy. Additionally, the
managers of the corporation, as representatives of the workers, would tend to avoid
oppressive practices, thus serving its negative purpose.94
92. See generally PAUL BLUMBERG, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY: THE SOCIOLOGY OF PARTICIPATION (1968)
(documenting various examples of worker management at different levels of control). One notable example that
exercised substantial influence on the field involved the composite longwall system in the Durham (England)
coalfields. See E.L. TRIST, ORGANIZATIONAL CHOICE: CAPABILITY OF GROUPS AT THE COAL FACE UNDER
CHANGING TECHNOLOGIES: THE LOSS, RE-DISCOVERY AND TRANSFORMATION OF A WORK TRADITION (1963).
More recent attention has focused on a number of worker participation projects in Sweden. See generally, e.g.,
Olaf Bergqvist, Worker Participation in Decisions within Undertakings in Sweden, 5 COMP. LAB. L. 65 (1982);
Clyde Summers, Worker Participation in Sweden and the United States: Some Comparisons from an American
Perspective, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 175 (1984).
93. See supra note 63.
94. One current theory of the firm is managerial hegemony, where the appointed managers are not only
independent, but use a variety of techniques to control and dominate the workers. See generally J.W. LORSCH &
ELIZABETH MCIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES? THE REALITY OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS, IN THOMAS
CLARKE, ED., THEORIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 108 (2004). While the capacity of managers to these various techniques can be questioned, see
Steven P. Vallas, The Adventures of Managerial Hegemony: Teamwork, Ideology and Worker Resistance, 50
SOC. PROBS. 204 (2003), it can be regarded as a real threat to workers. Having the managers elected by the workers
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Although attention tends to focus on the large corporations that dominate our
economy, employing tens or hundreds of thousands of workers and generating
billions of dollars in income, many corporations are quite small, and there is
typically no lower limit to the size of a firm that can make use of the corporate
form. Below a certain size—say one hundred employees in a single location—
representation is not necessary, and at an even lower size—say twenty-five
employees—it does not even make sense. But the principle of popular economic
sovereignty can be instantiated in such settings by direct participation, the
equivalent to the political mechanism of direct democracy. This solution is not a
problem for the idea of popular economic sovereignty. In fact, according to many
classic democratic thinkers, such as Aristotle and Rousseau,95 direct democracy is
the only acceptable form of democracy, and even many modern thinkers regret its
impossibility in modern mass society and regard representative democracy as the
problematic modality.96
Worker cooperatives—worker-owned corporations—would satisfy the
principle of popular economic sovereignty. But so would stockholder-owned
corporations. Far from being an intrusion on capitalist principles of ownership, the
division of authority between the owners and the managers in a system of popular
economic sovereignty would be essentially the same as it is at present. The
employee’s representative would control all the conditions of employment, but the
owners, again by means of voting stock, would determine the continued existence
and general structure of the firm. The two would negotiate with each other
regarding the division of income among wages, benefits, improvement of working
conditions dividends, loans, and corporate savings, much as the managers and
owners now negotiate with an effective employee union.97 There would probably
be a greater tendency to provide employees with profit-based compensation of
some sort, but this is not necessarily inefficient. The owners might favor popular
economic sovereignty as a means of giving the employees an incentive to support
would seem to provide an effective antidote.
95. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (G.D.H. Cole, trans., 1920) (1762). As noted above,
Aristotle does not consider a government run by elected officials to be a democracy at all. Aristotle, Politics,
supra note 38, at 476–502; CARTLEDGE, supra note 38, at 77–90, 105–22.
96. See generally, e.g., BERNARD MANIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1997); John
G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy Works, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 185 (2005).
97. This boundary is likely to be complex, given the number and variety of modern firms. While some
investors, even large ones, make choices on the basis of portfolio management and make no effort to influence
managerial decision-making, others take a more active role, although rarely at the level of day-to-day
management. See generally, e.g., Alon Brav, et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm
Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729 (2008) (describing how hedge funds employ distinct forms of shareholder activism
that effectively reduce agency costs); Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a
Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. REG. 174 (2001) (explaining how activism by mutual
funds and pension funds rarely achieves significant shareholder benefits). In fact, shareholder activism, whatever
its current value, might be more beneficial for worker managed firms than it is at present, both because it would
provide a more contrasting perspective for managers chosen by workers than for current managers, and because
it might reassure the market that the firm is being managed with fiscal considerations in mind.
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long-term corporate growth strategies, while the employees might favor it as a
savings vehicle with upside potential.
It is difficult to know whether this mode of management would be more or less
efficient than the current system in the United States. The most glaring defects in
the current system are the agency problems that emerge directly from the BerleMeans analysis and have been the focus of so much corporate governance
scholarship. Due to interlocking boards of directors and a woeful lack of
regulation, managers salaries are currently set at excessively high levels.98
Managers also have an easy exit option because they can readily move to another
company or retire in excessive luxury, and the notorious “golden parachutes” that
managers award to each other exacerbate this problem.99 In addition, when
stockholders loosely control managers, the managers can engage in various
irrational strategies, such as making excessive political contributions to
conservative politicians who are in fact bad for business100 or favoring the
acquisition of companies to satisfy their personal idiosyncrasies.101
If worker representatives selected managers, the managers might be more
likely to adopt the stewardship approach that some commentators favor.102 Perhaps
they would tend to grant employees overly high wages, more extensive benefits,
or more gracious working conditions.103 But they would be less likely to obtain
their currently exorbitant compensation if they could only retain their position
when elected by the workers. While any given employee certainly has an exit

98. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004); STEVEN CLIFFORD, THE CEO PAY MACHINE: HOW IT TRASHES AMERICA
AND HOW TO STOP IT (2017); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency
Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71 (2003); David Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company
News Announcements, 52 J. FIN. 449 (1997).
99. Philip L. Cochran, et al., The Composition of Boards of Directors and Incidence of Golden Parachutes,
28 ACAD. MGMT. J. 664 (1985); Judith C. Machlin, et al., The Effect of Golden Parachutes on Takeover Activity,
36 J.L. & ECON. 861 (1993).
100. See generally Alan S. Binder & Mark W. Watson, Presidents and the US Economy: An Econometric
Exploration, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 1015 (2016) (analyzing economic performance under presidents from Truman
to Obama reveals: that job growth was 2.2 times greater under the Democrats; that unemployment decreased an
average of 0.8% under Democrats and increased by an average of 1.1% under Republicans; that real GDP growth
was 1.7 times greater under Democrats; that budget deficits increased by 0.7% more under Republicans; that the
S&P index returned an average of 8.4% under Democrats and 2.7% under Republicans, or 3.1 times as much; and
that 41 of the 49 quarters when the economy was in recession during the time period studied occurred during
Republican administrations).
101. OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR: MANAGERIAL OBJECTIVES IN
A THEORY OF THE FIRM (1964); Michael Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986).
102. See James F. Davis, et al., Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management, in CLARKE, supra note 94,
at 118.
103. In considering the welfare of the workers, they might adopt policies more beneficial to the firm than
current managers, even if those managers are relatively free from agency problems and motivated to maximize
shareholder value. See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS AND THE PUBLIC (2012).
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option,104 it is probably more limited than the managers’, and the mass of
employees have no such option at all. They are bound as a group to the corporation,
and thus incentivized to increase its income and viability. Moreover, the size of the
group would tend to suppress idiosyncratic behavior and move toward
considerations of the common good—a feature of democracy noted by Rousseau105
and supported by the work of contemporary political theorists.106
The idea of popular economic sovereignty obviously extends beyond public
corporations to include all business enterprises, as well as many individuals who
employ other individuals. Popular economic sovereignty requires a somewhat
greater departure from current practice, but the required changes would not be
overly disruptive and might have significant collateral advantages. Partnerships
would not present a problem. For the most part, a business partnership functions
as a direct democracy and thus satisfies the principle without any alteration from
its present form.107 At some point, a partnership might involve certain inequalities
in voting or other forms of control that—while acceptable under state law—would
raise questions regarding economic sovereignty, but these occur at a level of detail
that specific regulation would need to resolve. It is also true, of course, that a
partnership can employ non-partners, but then it is functioning as a private
employer, the category below.
Non-corporate entities also employ many people. These can be partnerships,
firms organized under some other provision of state law, or individuals. Many of
these employment relationships have a structure that is too small scale and
informal for the corporate democracy model where employees elect
representatives. In numerous cases, this is more similar to a personal relationship
that any sort of formalized structure would disrupt. There is, nonetheless, a
plausible and pragmatic way to institute popular economic sovereignty in this
context. No one, with exceptions discussed below, could permissibly hire another
person directly. Instead, the hiring party would need to contract with an
employment agency or labor exchange. Consistent with the principle of popular
economic sovereignty, these agencies or exchanges would be either worker
cooperatives or—more likely—corporations that worker-elected representatives
manage.108
104. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY (2004) (contrasting the decision
by members of an organization to leave the organization with their decision to remain and either object to its
policies or commit themselves to the existing situation).
105. ROUSSEAU, supra note 95.
106. DAVID ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHIC FRAMEWORK (2009).
107. See, e.g., DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS FOR AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND
LLCS 245–357 (Wolters Kluwer 5th ed. 2017); GEOFFREY MORSE, PARTNERSHIP AND LLP LAW (Oxford Univ.
Press 8th ed. 2015).
108. A clarification that is perhaps at a level of detail beyond the range of this discussion may nonetheless
be helpful. Large labor exchanges would have managers chosen by representatives of its employees, which in this
case would be both the workers being placed (who would, in effect, be working for the exchange that was in
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The relationship between employers and these labor exchanges can take two
basic forms. First, an employer might apply to the exchange for employees, then
interview and select the people who the labor exchanges provide in response to the
request. The employer and exchange would negotiate the terms of employment,
including responsibilities, wages, benefits and working conditions. Second, an
employer might want to hire a specific individual. In that case, the person would
be required to join an exchange, and the terms of employment would again be
negotiated between the exchange and the employer. The labor exchanges would of
course need to follow strict non-discrimination rules, subject to exceptions stated
below, and thus accept any person who wants to join in order to accept
employment. They would be allowed however, to restrict their activities to
particular types of jobs or particular industries. Since they would generally be forprofit firms, they would have an incentive to place as many people as possible,
either generally or in their chosen field. In both cases, consistent with the principle
of popular economic sovereignty, the employee would in effect be working for the
employee-controlled labor exchange, not directly for the employer.
As for economic practicalities, there would undoubtedly be some increased
transaction costs involved in the indirect mode of hiring, although standard form
contracts would ameliorate the problem. But there would also be a substantial
economic benefit for the employees, and for the society as a whole. One of the
most distinctive features of the recent (say, the last fifty years) economy is the rise
of outsourcing and the use of part-time employees. This may be the result of
modern data processing capacities; a complex schedule of part time employees that
would previously have incurred prohibitive transaction costs can now be easily
managed. Whatever the cause, the result has been grinding oppression for many of
these part time workers.109 They do not receive benefits, they have no job security,
they cannot depend on regular hours or a regular income, and they are subject to
deleterious working conditions. Intermittent, instrumental connections with their
employer have replaced the personal relations that might moderate their treatment.
Employers of all sizes are using this approach, from the largest corporations to
small shops with a dozen part-time workers.
This is precisely the sort of abuse that the employment relationship makes
possible, and that popular economic sovereignty would succeed in preventing.
Every employer would need to obtain workers from a labor exchange. The
exchanges, although in competition with each other, would presumably negotiate
for decent terms, particularly given that they would be employee-controlled. They
contract with the firm that hired them) and its own staff who carried out the work of the exchange itself. This
might be a case where it would be useful to divide the electorate by category of workers.
109. KATHRYN EDEN & H. LUKE SHAEFER, $2.00 A DAY: LIVING ON ALMOST NOTHING IN AMERICA (2016);
BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA (2011); ARNE L. KALLEBERG,
GOOD JOBS, BAD JOBS: THE RISE OF POLARIZED AND PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1970S TO 2000S (2011).
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would be able to have skilled professionals negotiating their contracts, something
obviously beyond the reach of a single, low-wage employee. The exchanges might
well be able to satisfy the legitimate need of employers for flexibility, such as
seasonal variations in the number of workers required, while protecting the
workers against the uncertainties and dislocations that would otherwise result.
Presumably, popular economic sovereignty would take the place of unions, at
least in most situations. While unions and collective bargaining agreements were
a natural response to the oppression of workers by owners, and may have saved
capitalist nations from being torn apart by social revolution, they have not proved
to be a particularly effective model in the modern economy.110 Where they are very
strong, unions have sometimes undermined the economic viability of their
employees because of their ethos of worker solidarity unconnected to specific
firms.111 More often, employers have readily out-maneuvered unions, which have
proven ineffective in preventing the movement toward part-time workers. In any
event, unions protect only one in every ten workers.112 Popular economic
sovereignty would provide all workers with more reliable protection because it
would impose conditions that employers could not readily circumvent.
There would obviously be many complexities in designing a system of popular
economic sovereignty that would deal with the great variety of employment
relationships in the modern economy. Certain exceptions that do not appear in
popular political sovereignty would be necessary or desirable because the analogy
between the political and economic realms breaks down at certain points. Although
every adult family member has the right to vote, it may be appropriate to exclude
family enterprises from the labor exchange requirement on grounds that a family
is an economic unit. Religious institutions would be exempt with respect to
employees who carry out their basic functions, but not for those performing
maintenance tasks such as bookkeepers or janitors. Government employees would
also be exempt, on grounds that popular political sovereignty already secures the

110. RONALD L. FILIPPELLI, COLD WAR IN THE WORKING CLASS: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE UNITED
ELECTRICAL WORKERS (1994) (describing the conflicting ideologies that undermined the unity of the union
movement); DAVID WITWER & CATHERINE RIOS, MURDER IN THE GARMENT DISTRICT: THE GRIP OF ORGANIZED
CRIME AND THE DECLINE OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES (2020); William T. Dickens & Jonathan S. Leonard,
Accounting for the Decline in Union Membership, 1950-1980, 38 ILR REV, 323 (1985); C. Timothy Koeller,
Union Activity and the Decline of American Trade Union Membership, 15 J. LAB. RSCH. 19 (1994).
111. See, e.g., ALEX TAYLOR III, SIXTY TO ZERO: AN INSIDE LOOK AT THE COLLAPSE OF GENERAL MOTORS
– AND THE DETROIT AUTO INDUSTRY (2010) (describing how United Auto Workers Union was able to negotiate
lucrative wage, benefit and retirement packages that GM could not sustain as its market share sank, leading to its
ultimate bankruptcy).
112. Union Members Summary, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/
union2.nr0.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2021) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting in
2020, the percent of wage and salary workers who were members of unions—the union membership rate—was
10.8 percent, up by 0.5 percentage point from 2019 and the number of wage and salary workers belonging to
unions, at 14.3 million in 2020, was down by 321,000, or 2.2 percent, from 2019).
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fairness of their treatment, and that economic sovereignty might impede that more
basic form of citizen control.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article argues that there is a deeply organic link between democratic
government and corporate organization based on their etiology. Both the state and
the corporation—as we currently conceive them—emerged from the corporativist
thinking of the Middle Ages and the idea that an institution could be socially
constructed as a juridical person capable of action. That type of thinking also led
to the construction of groups of individuals as a juridical entity that could elect a
representative to act for them. Originally a mere device developed to advance
monarchical centralization, this notion proved so powerful that it could serve as
the basis of democratic governance for massive modern states. Groups of citizens
could elect representatives to control the state and induce it to act in their interest—
a process that can be described as popular political sovereignty.
Based on the common origin and conceptual structure of the state and the
corporation, this notion can extend from politics to economic institutions. The
connection is not the usual one of treating democratic principles as a more effective
means of corporate management, nor the less common but still prevalent one of
using worker participation as practice for politics. Rather, the extension suggested
here is direct and normative. Just as our understanding of political representation
has evolved to the point where we recognize that every competent adult should
have the right to vote, every working person should have the right to control his or
her own working conditions—either directly or more commonly—by electing
representatives who control the setting where they work. No one should be subject
to an employer’s control. This principle—popular economic sovereignty—would
serve the same deeply felt, normative purposes that democracy serves in the
political arena. It would provide workers with a sense of autonomy and dignity,
and it would protect them from oppressive treatment.
Clearly, popular economic sovereignty will not be implemented any time
soon—and probably not ever. But the inquiry is useful in highlighting problematic
features of our current economic system and the way in which it is essentially
inconsistent with the democratic norms on which we insist for our government.
Exploring the way in which the underlying principles of our political system can
extend into our economic system reveals the subordination and oppression to
which people are subject, whether they work in one of our largest firms, a
corporation employing hundreds of thousands, or one of the smallest employment
settings, such as a household or shop with a single employee. It warns us not to
rest content with the National Labor Relations Act113 or the Occupational Safety
113. Pub. L. No. 74–198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169.
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and Health Act,114 but to continue developing ways to create a just and equitable
society for the vast majority of our citizens who must work for a living.

114. Pub. L. No. 91–596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970), codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.
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